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Contextual Determinism and Foreign Relations Federalism
PeterJ. Spiro*

No doubt we are today trolling murky waters in matters involving the
intersection of the domestic constitutional order and the global system.' By way of
evidence for the proposition, foreign relations law must now be counted among the
hottest topics in the legal academy. The top law reviews in recent years have included
many contributions in the area; indeed, one might venture that there have been more
articles on foreign relations law subjects in the past five years than in the preceding
twenty-five. Issues relating to the treaty power, the status of international law in our
constitutional order, the role of the courts in resolving foreign relations controversies,
and the role of the states on the international scene-all and more have been the
subject of heated debate.
This interest can't simply be explained in terms of Curtis Bradley, Jack
Goldsmith, and others taking advantage of a ripe opportunity for some revisionist
scholarship-although their energy in reexamining the canon of foreign relations law
is certainly an important part of the story. One must, I think, also attribute the
renewed interest in foreign relations lav to the possible transformation of the
international system and the advent of globalization. Foreign relations law is
definitionally concerned with the intersection of the domestic and the international; it
cannot be fully comprehended as an endogenous system. Its study must account for
the global context to which it relates. And that presents a missing element in foreign
relations law scholarship in general, most of which makes only passing reference to
recent changes on the world scene.
In this respect, recent work on foreign relations federalism proves fairly typical.
Much of it at least implicitly presumes the matter to be governed by the standard
metrics of constitutional law, ones that consult the international context only
incidentally. Thus, Michael Ramsey argues that the states should be afforded a
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greater role in foreign policymaking as a matter of original constitutional intent.2 Jack
Goldsmith alleges a nineteenth and early twentieth-century tradition of such state
activity to undermine the legitimacy of what he calls the "modern" rule barring it.'
The constitutional doctrine is argued both ways on its own terms, with Zscbernig,4
Barclays Bank,5 and now Crosby6 as flashpoints. Much analysis focuses on the respective
institutional capacities of the courts and the political branches,' discussion that tracks
similar debates in the domestic constitutional arena.
In these treatments, the changed global context is given little more than a nod.
Globalization emerges variously as a qualified concession-as something that cannot
be ignored but which is at the same time played down as either cliched or
exaggerated-or as a sort ofjoker in the deck, a card that isn't necessary to a winning
argument but might add to the margin of persuasion. The nationalists tend to
minimize its significance.' On this battleground they are defenders of the doctrinal
status quo; the transformation of international relations poses for them a natural
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See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understandingof Foreign
Policy Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 341 (1999) (arguing that state discretion in foreign
policymaking was intended as a check on executive power). See also Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating
Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 Duke L J 1127 (2000) (finding state
foreign policymaking to be constrained by text, structure, and original understanding of the treaty
power).
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617, 1641-64
(1997). But see Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U Col L Rev 1223, 1228-41 (1999)
(drawing nineteenth-century foundations of exclusion of states from foreign relations activity).
Zscbernig v Miller, 389 US 429 (1968). Compare Swaine, 49 Duke L J at 1145 (cited in note 2)
(noting criticism of the decision) with Spiro, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1242 (cited in note 3) (defending
Zscbernig in its
historical context).
Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Bd, 512 US 298 (1994). Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
Harv L Rev 815, 865 (1997) (suggesting that in the wake of Barclays Bank, the dormant foreign
affairs
power "retains little, if any, validity") with David M. Golove, Treaty-Makingand the Nation: The
HistoricalFoundationsof the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich L Rev 1075, 1300 (2000)
("The idea that Barclays Bank has somehow overridden all that past history is, to say the least, wildly
exaggerated, if nor outright misleading.").
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000). Compare, for example, Ernest A.Young,
Dual Federalism, ConcurrentJurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo Wash L Rev 139, 140
(2001), (arguing that Crosby "departed from normal rules of preemption" in invalidating state
selective purchasing measure) with Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-PrintzWorld,
36 Tulsa LJ 11, 26 (2000) (arguing that the Court in Crosby applied ordinary principles of statutory
interpretation).
Compare Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev at 1680-98 (cited in note 3) (arguing that courts are less wellequipped than Congress to police state activity that interferes with national foreign relations) with
Spiro, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1253-59 (cited in note 3) and Swaine, 49 Duke LJ at 1246-54 (cited in
note 2) (both highlighting institutional reasons why Congress may not effectively perform this
policing function).
See, for example, Swaine, 49 Duke LJ at 1238 (cited in note 2) (stressing that the "much ballyhooed
leap into globalization" presents continuation of earlier trends).
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challenge to the established order rather than an element of the defense. The
revisionists, by contrast, are of two minds on globalization's significance. On the one
hand, to the extent globalization gives cause to reexamine the conventional wisdom, it
serves their purposes.' On the other, they are uncomfortable with the fact of
globalization and the deeper challenge it may pose to their restorationist objectives.
On the matter of foreign relations federalism, revisionists appear to assume that
constitutionally insulating state-level authority from federal control will also insulate it
from international constraints." Acknowledging the magnitude of globalization
threatens that premise.
That explains the continued marginalization of global context in recent
scholarship. But it doesn't justify it. To take Ed Swaine's yardstick, it is only by
reference to that context that we can "know what values lie in the balance."" Of
course these values will be informed by some, but nor all, of the background values
grounding federalism in other contexts, and that mayjustify bringing to bear the usual
analytical strategies. But the ultimate balance here, at least in the past, has been
decisively determined by the structure of the international system. Thus, it is only by
reference to the international system that one can explain why there has been a need
to maintain the supremacy of federal policy. That value, and the "one voice" mantra
associated with it, is a meaningless quantity when untethered from the international
system. One cannot make sense of foreign relations federalism without that
contextualization.
Such recognition as there is in the literature of globalization seems also to fall
short in substantive characterization. The standard line of argument is that
globalization has "blurred" the line between the domestic and the foreign." It's an
important point, so much so that it has almost instantly established itself as clich6
(perhaps yet another reason why it is skipped over with little attention). But the
observation bears further scrutiny. The line-blurring refrain reduces to an assertion of
an intensified relationship between the local and the international; the local act now

9.

10.

11.
12.

See, for example, Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev at 1670-80 (cited in note 3) (highlighting the "vaning
distinction between domestic and foreign affairs" as among the reasons for abandoning dormant
foreign affairs power).
As Judith Resnik observes, those who support the Courts new federalism jurisprudence see it as
"fortify[ing the United States against transnational norms because the current logiic of United
Stares legal federalism contains the precept that, if a category of behavior is committed to state
governance, then it cannot, by definition, be subject to international governance." Judith Ranik,
CategoricalFederalisrnGender, Jurisdictionand One Globe, 111 Yale L J (forthcoming 2001). See also
Peter J. Spiro, T1 New Sovereigntists, American Exceptionalism and Its False Proirkas,79 Foreign Aff 9
(Nov/Dec 2000) (describing the revisionist premise that the United States can insuhte it-l from
international norms and institutions).
Swaine, 2 ChiJ Ind L at 343 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 S Cc Rev 175, 19%n 91
(noting that observation is now "standard in the literature).
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often has global implications, intentionally or not. States interact with foreigners;
their laws are measured against international human rights; they seek to sell their
products abroad and to attract foreign investment at home. Indeed, as Ernie Young
notes, one can apply a Wickard-like analysis to every private economic act, so that the
sale of a single grain of wheat, or whatever, now can be tied into the global dynamic."
But this may not represent a change of qualitative dimensions. State-level
activity has frequently bumped up against international norms and actors. There is,
for instance, a long line of episodes stretching back to the founding era in which state
treatment of aliens in the realm of criminal, property, and estate law has given rise to
international disputes under the international law doctrine of state responsibility.
Modern human rights standards, it is true, also constrain a government's treatment of
its own citizens, but the expansion is firmly grounded in these longstanding norms.
Even the Wickard proposition can be stretched back in time. The United States has
never been an autarky; on the contrary, international trade has always been crucial to
its prosperity. On the same terms that chaos theory has the butterfly in Brazil causing
a tornado in Texas, then, the single economic act has always carried international
significance.
Even assuming that line-blurring includes some qualitative change in how the
local connects to the international, however, it is not clear which way this cuts for
purposes of state activity implicating foreign relations. On the one hand, as the
revisionists argue, if all state-level decisionmaking has international implications, the
states can hardly be excluded from such activity. The revisionists throw up their
hands, in effect, asserting that if everything domestic is also international, then the
usual federalism regime should apply in which states should be able to do as they
please except where the federal political branches tell them otherwise.14 The
nationalists argue, by contrast, that globalization undercuts federalism's
experimentation rationale, 5 and that those few activities with detrimental effects on
national foreign relations can be judicially sorted from the greater part of benign

13.

14.

15.

See Young, 69 Geo Wash L Rev at 179 (cited in note 6) ("Mr. Filburn's consumption of his own
crop, for example, would affect the price of wheat not only in Omaha, but potentially in Frankfurt as
well.").
See, for example, id at 181 (cited in note 6) ("if we cannot define an area of exclusive federal power
by reference to these [foreign relations] concerns ... then the whole enterprise of an exclusive federal
'foreign affairs' seems questionable"); Goldsmith, 2000 S Ct Rev at 197 (cited in note 12) (with
respect to preemption, "[i]f a federal statute simultaneously implicates foreign affairs and a
traditional state prerogative, the canons suggest that the Constitution creates both a presumption
for and against preemption, which is nonsense").
See, for example, Swaine, 2 Chi J Intl L at 346 (cited in note 1) ("if state policies become
proportionately more occupied with external relations, the diversity of their local determinants
dwindles").

'o1

2 N''o. 2

Contextuaf&Determinismn and Tore i".fationslederafism

conduct. 6 As a debate taken on its terms, I tend to agree with the nationalists on
these points. This is how foreign relations federalism has operated for two centuries.
When it comes to clear norms of international law, the laboratory argument for state
discretion does not amount to much;" and the fact is that only a few episodes-even
in globalization's wake-have had the sort of harmful effect on foreign relations
against which the doctrine has always been directed.
So much for line-blurring. By itself, it doesn't change the context in a way that
demands change in the doctrine. But globalization amounts to more than this; it
poses the possibility of an architectural change in the way nations deal with each other
and their subdivisions. The crucial switch is found in notions of international
responsibility. In the past, national governments were, as a matter of law and practice,
held responsible for the misdeeds of subnational authorities. That made sense in a
world of diverse governance systems, for it would have involved high transaction costs
for each state to understand varying allocations of authority within other states,
especially where contact with subnational authorities was episodic. It would also have
been difficult to hold subnational authorities accountable for their wrongs, in any
concrete fashion, where episodic contacts did not entrench remedial mechanisms.
Take the late nineteenth century example of Louisiana's failure to afford
adequate protection (as required by international law) to Italian nationals from mob
violence. *8 Even assuming that Italy understood American federalism and the general
autonomy afforded states in matters involving local law enforcement, it would have
been difficult for Italy to have sought a remedy directly from Louisiana, in the absence
of established communication channels and leverage points. Remedial entreaties, and
the threat of retaliation, were more efficiently directed against Washington, and that
efficiency was reflected in international law doctrines under which Italy could respond
against the United States as a whole for the misdeeds of the component part. This
context dictated the rule against state-level interference with foreign relations; the
externalities of state action were too great to tolerate in a fragile international
environment.
But globalization shifts the balance. International actors, for the most part, do
now understand the internal workings of other nations. They have regular contact
with subnational authorities, and, perhaps most importantly, they have gained
leverage over subnational entities. In the face of globalization, international economic
16.
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See Spiro, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1255-58 (cited in note 3) (asserting that courts have demonstrated
an institutional competency in determining whether state measures interfere with foreign relations).
With respect, for instance, to the application of the death penalty, if one were to accept the
laboratory argument in that context, one would have to accept the same argument with respect to
torture and other universally accepted human rights. Other international norms impicate interjurisdictional relations, where an experimentation rationale would fail in the same way that it does
with respect to the Commerce Clause.
See Spiro, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1236 n 64 (cited in note 3).
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competitiveness is critical to local economic prosperity. The threat of lost foreign
investment or lost global sales offers the possibility of effective direct remedial action
If these direct remedial channels become
against subnational jurisdictions.
entrenched, national-level responsibility may become redundant or obsolete. In that
context, the subnational activity no longer poses a risk of interfering with national
policy, and there is no need to depart from the federalism construct that governs other
areas of regulation.
Of course, the "if' here is a significant one. 9 Although the institutional logic of
what I call targeted retaliation seems powerful, and recent developments suggest its
viability and possible emergence, 20 I cannot pretend to say that this responsibility
regime is firmly in place. This, and not the timidity of the Supreme Court, explains
the murkiness of these waters. We are witnessing some great changes in the
international system, that are only now beginning to take shape. To the extent that
the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs power is contingent on the contours of
the international system and of its treatment of subnational actors, it too will remain
in flux until the new landscape comes into better focus.
In the meantime, nothing the Supreme Court gives us will settle the matter. The
Court is probably a lagging indicator on such matters, fearful (as it tends to be) of
making missteps on foreign relations questions. Crosby is in that sense a time-bider, a
ruling that allows for future flexibility, either in reaffirming the differential federalism
rules that apply to foreign relations or in charting a path towards the differential's
elimination. In the meantime, the political branches will probably provide earlier and
more significant evidence on the evolution of constitutional norms in the area.21 One
indicator will be the fashioning of future federal sanctions regimes in Crosby's wake. If
sanctions measures come to include boilerplate savings provisions expressly approving
subfederal action, that would effectively nullify Crosby and signal a shift towards
greater constitutional toleration of such activity. Another is the emerging practice of
what Ed Swaine calls "informed consent, under which federal authorities are
increasingly solicitous of state interests in the fashioning of federal foreign policy.
Although that practice concerns federal policy, it is consistent with the recognition of
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See, for example, Goldsmith, 83 Va L Rev at 1679 n 253 (cited in note 3) (questioning targeted
retaliation thesis); Swaine, 49 Duke L J at 1240-41 (cited in note 2) ("Although cases of targeted
retaliation are not unknown, it is hard to find examples demonstrating its sufficiency.").
See Spiro, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1261-67 (cited in note 3) (describing examples).
See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties,Executive Agreements, and ConstitutionalMethod, 79 Tex L Rev 961, 100934 (sketching model for processing the constitutional significance of institutional developments
outside the courts).
Swaine, 2 ChiJ Intl L at 351 (cited in note 1).
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significant state interests in international policyrmaking and with expanded state
discretion in the area.2
So too we should continue exploring other issues of foreign relations law.
Because it is an area in which the courts are secondary players, scholars can assume a
greater role as agents of change and of clarification than in other fields. In that light,
the current academic focus on the foreign relations law canon takes on an added
importance, for it is not of academic interest only. Ultimately, however, the
international context will dictate the Constitution's new take on these old issues.

23.

Acceptance of Swaine's suggestion that states inform the federal government of activity affecting
foreign relations would evidence a continuing constitutional wariness, see id at 351-52, but I think
this proposal so unlikely as to be almost implausible. That implausibility may itself highlight the
trend line on the question toward greater constitutional tolerance of direct state participation in
global affairs.
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